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Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s
Die Gefahr/The Danger
Babette Babich

Abstract Heidegger’s question concerning technology was originally posed in
lectures to the Club of Bremen. This essay considers the totalizing role of technology in Heidegger’s day and our own, including a discussion of radio and calling for
a greater integration of Heidegger’s thinking and critical theory. Today’s media context and the increasing ecological pressures of our time may provide a way to think,
once again, the related notions of event [Ereignis] and ownedness [Eigentlichkeit].
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Constellating Technology
»Die Konstellation des Seyns spreche uns an.«
— Heidegger, Die Kehre

On December 1, 1949, Heidegger addressed the Club of Bremen under the title:
Insight Into That Which Is, featuring four sub-lectures, each one lengthy enough to
count as a lecture in its own right.1 A few months later, Heidegger reprised the
colloquium in Baden-Baden on two successive days on the 25th and 26th of March,
1950. A popular account of the Baden-Baden lectures in Der Spiegel invokes
Heidegger’s influence on Sartre and the French Existentialist movement,2 but
reflects that if it is the image of the philosopher in his Black Forest cabin that “makes

1

Martin Heidegger (1994). Cf. Heidegger (2012) and see for translations of “The Question
Concerning Technology” and “The Turn” as well as the additional essays, “The Age of World
Picture” and “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger (1977b).
2
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headlines,”3 the most newsworthy event would be the two day lecture series:
described as an “absolute exception,” and emphasizing that Heidegger was technically still banned from teaching. There is an obvious dispute about the dates of the
official ban4 yet what is not disputable is that Heidegger would not resume university teaching at Freiburg until 1951.5 What is also not in dispute is that under the
Nazis, Heidegger was deemed insufficiently important (“scientifically” or as a
scholar) and he was relieved from service in university and re-assigned to service in
the Volksturm following the heavy bombing attack on Freiburg.
Towards the end of the war itself Heidegger managed to get permission to relocate
his papers to Messkirch and he also offered a conflict-laden reading of Hölderlin in a
lecture held in a castle above Beuron to which he and other university faculty retreated,
speaking there not on needfulness [Die Not] or desperate times [dürftiger Zeit] but
(and much rather), Die Armut, poverty.6 Still or in any case, the Spiegel’s assertion of
an ‘absolute exception’ seems less than accurate for two days of lectures reprising the
one day Bremen lectures held three months earlier.7 Indeed Heidegger tells us that he
would repeat the Bremen lectures on other occasions, the most well-known of which
being a presentation of these lectures in Munich at the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts
in Munich, on June 6, 1950, where he presented the first, second, and last lecture of
the series of four lectures presented in Bremen and repeated in Baden-Baden.
The first lecture was titled Das Ding [The Thing], the second Das Ge-Stell—which
may be variously translated, most popularly, as “The Enframing” or, more recently, as
“The Positionality” or even, with a Brooklyn (and I hope suitably gangster accent)
“The Set-Up,”—the third, Die Gefahr [The Danger], and the fourth, Die Kehre [The
Turn]. Five years later, in 1954, Heidegger featured the central themes from these
lectures in his Vorträge und Aufsätze, published in 1954, in which Die Frage nach der
Technik, “The Question Concerning Technology,” has pride of place as the first chapter,
followed by “Science and Reflection” and so on.8 Indeed, had Heidegger scholarship
been differently, hermeneutically minded, rather as Joe Kockelmans has been able to

3

Ibid.
The suspension of Heidegger’s right to teach was imposed 1945–1949 but Heidegger would not
resume teaching until 1951, as Heidegger’s own comment on Richardson’s “Appendix” to his
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought indicates, Richardson (1993), 678–679. The recommendation of a period of 5 years appears in Jaspers’ Gutachten but as Günter Figal has noted,
among others like Rüdiger Safranski, the prohibition was indeed lifted as of 1949, although
Heidegger would not officially “resume teaching until after assuming emeritus status in 1951.” In:
Figal (2006), 38. See for an overview of relevant primary sources, Martin (1989).
5
There is some ambiguity as to what might be meant by a Berufsverbot or Lehrverbot and the
Spiegel article suggests that this refers to university as well as general or public lectures, such that
Heidegger’s commemorative lecture Wozu Dichter?, presented in 1946 in honor of Rilke would/
should also be counted as ‚lecturing.’
6
Heidegger’s June 27, 1945 Beuron lecture “Die Armut,” is apotheosized by Lacoue-Labarthe in
his introduction to Heidegger (2004).
7
Here too, if we are counting the ways Heidegger might be considered as ‘teaching,’ one may also
count a radio broadcast in 1951. Heidegger (1951); courtesy of Klett-Cotta und WDR.
8
See Heidegger’s (1978 [1954]a, b).
4
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read Heidegger, along with a few others like Ted Kisiel, like Hans Seigfried and
Patrick Heelan, all of whom read and foregrounded Heidegger’s thinking in the mid1960s through to the early 1980s on the topic of technology and modern science,
Heidegger’s collection of his Lectures and Essays (as yet untranslated as such) might
well have set the tone for the post-war Heidegger reception.
But as it happens the history of the reception of a thinker’s ideas is often the
history of the reception of the translation of those ideas. Thus Ralph Manheim’s
translation of Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, first translated in 1959 and
thus in advance of Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Being and Time in
1962 along with the 1971 translations of the studies of poetry, language, and above
all the essay on the origin of the work of art, would entail for Anglophone readers
that Heidegger’s reflections on science and technology were relegated to second tier
in Heidegger scholarship.9 Yet things are not all that different in France, though one
may note Dominique Janicaud as exception and Rainer Bast, Ewald Richter, and
Carl-Friedrich Gethman in Germany.10
Today, in English language studies we may have the preconditions for a change
in English language Heidegger scholarship with Andrew Mitchell’s new translation
of the Bremen and Freiburg lectures.11 But the comparison of French and German
studies tells us that we should expect to take some time to add the question of
Heidegger and science to the issue of technology, a compound concern that and
along with his thinking on art Heidegger always saw in terms of what I am here
seeking to articulate as a constellation.
It was this same constellation that was in view for Kockelmans himself who,
along with the already mentioned Hans Seigfried and Patrick Heelan, authored
important early studies of Heidegger and the sciences.12 Kockelmans also went on,
together with Ted Kisiel, to dedicate an important collection to framing this thought
constellation within continental philosophy of science, with the alas relatively
utterly unreceived but indispensable collection, Phenomenology and the Natural
Sciences,13 together with Kockelmans’ own single authored Heidegger and
Science,14 which Kockelmans was able to explore as a central theme of his own
9

Cf. Heidegger (1959, 1962) as well as Heidegger (1971).
See, in particular, Janicaud (1985), as well as (patently: in addition to others, both earlier and
since): Bast (1986), Richter (1992) and see too Gethman’s (1991) as well as Seigfried’s (1991),
respectively.
11
Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, as cited above.
12
Instructively, the American tendency to fail to mention German and French scholarship on the
topic of Heidegger’s philosophy of science and above all to exclude mention of work done by
Kockelmans or Heelan, see for a recent instance, Heelan (2012) or Richardson as well as Seigfried
in favor of voices supposed to be received (at the time the names mentioned in passing were Hesse,
Lakatos, and Feyerabend, although the article’s actual citations were limited to Kuhn) characterizes Jack Caputo’s essay (1986). To be sure, Heidegger’s philosophy of science cannot be discussed apart from Heidegger’s engagement with Husserl and Kant and above all perhaps with
Nietzsche. See for this context, Babich (2010a).
13
Kockelmans and Kisiel (1970).
14
Kockelmans (1985a).
10
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research while also publishing in the same year a wide ranging study in Nijhoff’s
influential Phaenomenologica series on Heidegger on Art and Art Works.15
The story of continental philosophy of science and Heidegger is a complicated
one, not able to be related here but at the same time unable to be dispensed with
as it very directly affects the reception of Heidegger in philosophy of science in
particular but also in philosophy in general.16 Thus the fortunes of continental
philosophy as such and in contest with analytic philosophy and the overarching
ressentiment of things French and especially in the post-war years of things
German make a difference as well. In addition, analytic philosophy (as I argue
elsewhere)17 has tended to be especially suspicious of Heidegger’s focus on questioning or critique. To this it should also be acknowledged that critique per se had
been associated ever since Immanuel Kant himself with the encroaching danger of
nihilism, thus Heidegger’s 1939 lecture courses on Nietzsche’s epistemology
(entitled “The Will to Power as Knowledge”) and 1940 course on “Nihilism”
hardly helped matters in this regard.18 But as with many things, there is much
more than a single influence or factor.19 That these factors continue to interweave
and play in current understanding is also something I hope to foreground in what
follows.
The Bremen lectures for their own part draw on formulations unpublished (the
Beiträge) as well as published as we recall Heidegger’s 1946 “Letter on Humanism,”20
a letter composed in reply to the Jean Beaufret’s question to him in the wake of the
devastation of World War II, prompted in part in response to Jean-Paul Sartre’s Paris
lecture in the same post-war year: Existentialism is a Humanism.21

15

Kockelmans (1985b).
See, again, in general, Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science” and with specific
reference to Heidegger, see Babich (2012, 159–192 and 2013b). In addition to Trish Glazebrook’s
introductory overview: “Why Read Heidegger on Science?” in: Glazebrook, ed., Heidegger on
Science, 13–26, see too in the same collection Richter, “Heidegger’s Theses Concerning the
Question of the Foundations of the Sciences” (67–90) as well as important contributions by
Heelan, “Carnap and Heidegger: Parting Ways in the Philosophy of Science” (113–130) as well as
Ute Guzzoni “Gelassenheit: Beyond Technoscientific Thinking” (193–204) and Kiesel’s “A
Supratheoretical PreScientific Hermenutics of Scientific Discovery” (239–260).
On Heidegger and the disciplinary profession of philosophy as such, especially but not only in
Anglophone culture, see Babich (2003), 63–103.
17
See, for one example, a recent interview, Babich (2011), 37–71.
18
See for these courses: Heidegger (1991).
19
Kleinberg’s (2005) is, I think, a useful addition here, especially in the postwar context, but see
too for the pre-war context the now-standard reference on Heidegger-Carnap, Friedman
(2000)—cf. Heelan’s essay “Carnap and Heidegger” cited above—enhanced in depth by
Gordon’s (2012).
20
Heidegger (1954). Additional elements, were we tracing the history of the lectures themselves
can also be found in Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie and so on. Heidegger’s (1977c) and the
same translation is also included in the English edition of Heidegger’s Wegmarken by MacNeill
(1998).
21
Jean-Paul Sartre (1946, 2007).
16
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The Thing (the first of the lectures later reprised in Munich), is also included in
Vorträge und Aufsätze, together with Heidegger’s prefatory “Hinweis” or contextualizing reference to the ‘shrinking’ of time and space through the same wellknown technological means that continue to shrink distances to this day. And as
already noted, eight years later, a little contribution based on the Bavarian lectures
also appears as the first in the Neske series Opuscula aus wissenschaft und dichtung, entitled Die Technik und die Kehre and duly citing the context of the original
lectures.22
As a consequence, by 1962 all but one of the original four lectures had been
published, in one variant or reprise or another. My theme here focusses on that
otherwise unpublished essay, “The Danger,” Die Gefahr, although and of course
parts of the text are assimilated into The Question Concerning Technology. As this
point of assimilation also makes clear, a discussion cannot but include reference to
all four, especially Das Ge-Stell.
The thoughts Heidegger gathers together in these lectures, given as we are told,
and let it be noted again, over the course of a single day, and hence in a single breath
(the German celebrates just this capacity, doubtless due to the length of their sentences: der lange Atem being a term of approbation), go back to the Beiträge,
Heidegger’s supposed second major work, but a work scholars now largely disregard (after the initial flurry of interest).23 These days and already for some time we
have tended to focus on what we take to be the early Heidegger—roughly the preBeing and Time Heidegger, this being the bailiwick of either the very pious, literally
so, Heideggerians, or else those who follow and trace the origins of Heidegger’s
original thinking in the spirit of Ted Kisiel’s genealogical, phenomeno-philological
brand of Heidegger-hermeneutics. Then there is the later Heidegger, corresponding
largely to the Heidegger discussed here, but many people, especially in literature
departments also take this to be the Heidegger of Poetry Language Thought and On
the Way to Language, and so on all the way to Time and Being and the Discourse on
Thinking as well as the later seminars.
And yet the division into early Heidegger and late Heidegger, corresponding to
Heidegger I and Heidegger II, is problematic. Heidegger himself politely points this
out by foregrounding entanglement, rather in the guise of his Being and Time
discussion of future temporalization (out of the past) in his “Letter to Father
Richardson,” telling us (not really very helpfully) that
only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought
by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained
in [Heidegger] II.24

22

Heidegger (1962).
Heidegger’s originally unpublished Beiträge: vom Ereignis was published in his collected works
in advance of the schedule Heidegger had envisaged. It is also available in English in different editions, under two species of translation.
24
Heidegger (2003), 8.
23
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To take up Heidegger’s third lecture, Die Gefahr, it will be necessary to refer to
the lecture just preceding it on the technological frame or setup, Das Ge-Stell. Here,
I’d like to speak of the language thematic of both lectures (Ge-fahr, Ge-Stell) in a
way that is not made easier by the limitation of addressing the question in English,
as I am inevitably doing and just to the extent that the English translations cannot
but efface the prefixes in either case. The patent point is that these two words, as
different as they are, share the same prefix Ge- and that this is relevant as a word
form and substantively. Although it is not often done, it’s important to take note of
this because Heidegger’s mode of thinking through what he calls his Insight Into
That Which Is tacks a path through related notions (i.e., that which is). In this respect
he includes as the core of his lectures, two themes formed with a prefix, the “Ge-,”
a prefix, as we will all remember from Heidegger’s The Question Concerning
Technology, that he considers so very important that he talks about it there just as he
does in Das Ge-Stell, focusing on the painfully ungainly Ge-Stell, taking it apart,
literally by hyphenation and at what can appear to be surprising length. This gives
(or should give) a translator pause and William Lovitt, to his credit, thought about
the challenge it presented in his translation of The Question Concerning Technology25
and Andrew Mitchell, who has just published his translation of the original four
lectures with Indiana Press also gives his reasons for his rendering (though some
may have wished for more detail than the few lines he offers).26
The rendering of Gestell/Ge-Stell as “framework”/“positionality” may be due to
little more than the politics of re-translations, for and after all, a translator has to
change enough in order to justify the effort, and it can seem that where Lovitt has
“enframing,” Mitchell simply inserts, it can appear to have been a kind of cut and
paste, “positionality.” Thus Mitchell’s translation, which is a fluid one, has a dangerous side of its own as it tends to favor a one-to-one style of translation of the
sort that today’s Cambridge University Press translations have made into a kind of
analytic gold or plastic standard, perhaps this begins with the Fichte and Hegel
translations, but it is also (with some considerable and disastrous consequences) in
evidence in the Cambridge Nietzsche editions. According to this standardizing
standard, one finds an equivalent and settles for it, and to this extent the glossary in
the Mitchell translation is more literal than say the listing to be found in Macquarrie
and Robinson, for example.27
Gestell, a kind of physical array or constellation, means framework or structural
outline or scaffold. The word is significant because Gestellung also means muster,
and one can be ordered to such a mustering, commandeered or called up to service.
As is familiar to those of us who know his concern with the fortunes of technology,
traditional and modern, what Heidegger wishes to do here, after he has set up his
initial tracing reflections on modern technology per se, is to tease out the
25

In addition to his note on the transforms affected by such prefixes in his introduction (p. xx), see
William Lovitt’s footnote 17 in his translation of “The Question Concerning Technology,” in:
Heidegger (1977a), 3–35, here p. 19. Cf. note 14, p. 13, as well as notes pp. 15–16, pp. 16–17.
26
Andrew Mitchell (2012), xi.
27
Mitchell, “English German Glossary,” in: Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 173–198.
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determining or destining set up that is part and parcel of modern technology as this
intricately ordered and dependent set up is opposed to the cognate fitted-togetherness
but individually separable configuring of old-fashioned equipmentality, as such.
Tools qua tools have always involved referentiality. This is what Heidegger calls
Bewandtnis and it is the subject of his memorable analysis of handiness—handhabbarkeit—in Heidegger’s in Being and Time discussion of Zuhandenheit (BT 98/69),
namely readiness-to-hand and in turn and presuming such a readiness in its
modality as “unreadiness-to-hand,” the revelation of “being-just-present-at handand-no-more” (BT 103/73) as these fit together precisely in such a work context.
Using a hammer for a given project, whether it involves the kind of complexity that
would have engaged Heidegger’s own father as a cooper or joiner (these are related
carpenterly professions, but the unions to this day keep them well distinct), or just
hanging a picture on the wall, one is referred to a nail or, if this is a metal-free
project, think of a trip to IKEA or more romantically, think of Eric Sloane’s America
where nails were expensive and using wood’s properties part of Yankee or New
England ingenuity (read thrift or cheapness), with the hammer will go the pegs or
cleats.28 The difference however is that the same claw hammer that nails nails,
removes nails (note that this does not apply to German hammers, they do not come
with a claw as one is meant to remove one’s nail with the proper tool) and the same
hammer, German or Sears Craftsman style can be used to break through a wall if
one wishes to remodel a kitchen or for other purposes of the sort and in my classes
on Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology, I sometimes like to imagine
circus acts, cirque du soleil meets gas station mechanic, juggling with three and then
four hammers and so on—these have to be claw hammers for the sake of showmanship and counterpoise. Modern technology quite specifically does not work like
that. If you misplace the charger for a new cellphone, you will find that using one of
the chargers in your collected array of chargers from cellphones gone by will be an
exercise in futility. Connectivity is the point. Modern technology, Heidegger argues,
goes beyond the traditional in-order-to of particular kinds of equipmentalities, the
kind of practical ordering or for-the-sake-of-which that Aristotle lists for us with
reference to the bridler’s art in the very first section of the Nichomachean Ethics.
In Being and Time, Heidegger refers to the aforementioned workshop array of tools
but he also lists the items on his own desk as tools of a kind: paper, desk blotter,
fountain pen, ink and so on. So today we might add to all those desk items, a computer, printer, internet connection, surely all this is the same—just update. Heidegger
thinks not and his four Bremen lectures, “Insight Into That Which Is,” try to explore
what is different in modern technology and that is to say to raise the question regarding technology as a question, just as we might remember that he has been at pains
to point out just how hard it is to ask after anything at all beginning with Being and
Time, section two of which unpacks what it means to question.
Thus and just to offer a contrasting illustration of the romantic sort that we can
use to document modern progress, Heidegger used a handsaw of the kind that
requires two workers to cut wood for use as fuel in the cabin his wife had arranged
28

See for example, Sloane’s (2004 [1965]).
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Fig. 1 Hans-Georg Gadamer and Martin Heidegger, Todtnauberg, 1923. Bildagentur dpa

to have built for him in 1922 and for which wood-cutting task he required the efforts
of one of his students, my own teacher Hans-Georg Gadamer.
Heidegger later sent a picture commemorating this moment to Gadamer as a
gift on his 75th birthday in 1975 and Gadamer thus includes it, with Heidegger’s
note, in his Philosophische Lehrjahre.29 The picture dates from 1923, that is: preBeing and Time, which would thus make this image, for those who like these
terms, a picture of Heidegger I (Fig. 1).
Let me note just because it matters in the current context that pants of the kind
worn by both Heidegger and Gadamer in this picture did not in fact testify to some
kind of back-to-the-land fascist movement but were standard for the time and there
are photos of my own father, who was born in New York City in 1935, wearing short
pants (i.e., not shorts) of a similar fashion, in pre-war NYC, circa 1940 or ‘41.
Details like these, ontic as they are, do not deter folk who have assumed that this
picture must date from at least a decade later, say circa 1933, or must even be a
postwar image, those who might claim that it provides iconic evidence for
Heidegger’s nostalgia for the past. For my part, I take the irony to be the labor itself
as, like Tom Sawyer, Heidegger commandeers Gadamer’s assistance to help him cut
some wood, ironic because of Gadamer’s later recollection that when he first met
Heidegger he took him for a manual-laborer—a Hausmeister—in NYC that would
be a super.
The thing about a two handed bow saw is that the ‘Gestell’ involved to support
the wood being sawed has as such no particular connection to the saw or the piece
of lumber. It is called a saw horse, technically, just as other Gestell types count as
clothes horses or racks, umbrella stands and the like, and you can buy these too at
29

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1995), 33.

Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s Die Gefahr/The Danger

161

IKEA and a pair of them will help you cut plywood but can also serve to hold a dinner table perfect for a fashionable loft kitchen. The components can be used together
or not, they are severable with respect to use but also distance and thus they are
more rather than less self-contained. Heidegger was therefore using the support of
such frames to position wood to cut with a bowsaw, given Gadamer’s help, given his
wife’s gift to him of a house in the high hills of the black forest (they are not really
mountains), rural land that was then, as a lot of land still is, without convenient
access to electricity,30 for example, although there was, and that would be a sine qua
non, water afforded by the famous spring to which Celan would dedicate his poem
Arnica, Eyebright, Arnika, Augentrost.31
By contrast and this is the point Heidegger seeks to make throughout, modern
technology, modern tools, power tools are different and everything turns on power
and its dependencies: thus nature in the purview of modern technoscience becomes
on Heidegger’s analysis something that it never was until modernity: a giant gas
station, a source for the development of natural resources, meaning energy, meaning electricity. In the case of a power tool you are tied to that referentiality by the
cord, even if you have a cordless drill, because as Hurricane Sandy reminded us in
New York City, you really need to charge cordless tools, including laptops and
iPads and cellphones. So whether it is an outlet (this becomes a kind of holy grail
for students looking to plug in their laptops or travelers looking to do the same), or
extension cord, they all point to the need for electricity, and all the stuff you will
have to think about if one gets a job at NYU (at NYU pay) and wishes to build a
cabin of one’s own upstate in New York’s Putnam county, say, you’ll need water,
cable, the works, and all that will be a pre-requisite before you can get to reflect
upon Heidegger’s observation that a mechanical tool “is nothing that separately
presences for itself.”32 In other words, that is to say that even in its components,
i.e., qua taken apart, as he also speaks about automobiles broken down for shipment, modern technology requires far more than just completeness unto itself to be
able to be set in motion. Thus contrasting the modern technological apparatus with
a self-propelled wheel assembly, like the spinning wheel or else like the “bucketwheel in the rice fields of China” as he invokes these still in use in rural china,
30

By the time the cabin was built it likely had electricity. Germany had electric lighting since the
1880s and by 1913 a good many households as well as the university in Freiburg itself used electricity. See for instance, Chickering (2007).
31
Celan’s poem was written after his 1957 visit to Heidegger’s hut in the Black Forest and was
included in a collection of Celan’s poetry entitled Lichtzwang published shortly after the poet’s
death in 1970. The title of the poem, Todtnauberg, is a metonymic allusion to place and the rest of
the poem seems to do the same: Arnika, Augentrost, der/Trunk aus dem Brunnen mit dem/
Sternwurfel drauf,//in der/Hütte,/die in das Buch/—wessen Namen nahms auf/vor dem meinen?—,/
die in dies Buch/geschriebene Zeile von/einer Hoffnung, heute,/auf eines Denkenden/kommendes/
Wort/im Herzen,//Waldwasen, uneingeebnet,/Orchis and Orchis, einzeln,/Krudes, später, im
Fahren,/deutlich,/der uns fährt, der Mensch,/der‘s mit anhört,//die halb-/beschrittenen Knüppel-/
pfade im Hochmoor,//Feuchtes,/viel.“Paul Celan (1980), 240–241 and (2000), Vol. 2, 255–256.
See for one discussion, Lyon (2006). See too Herman Rapaport’s chapter “Forces of Gravity” in
his Is There Truth in Art? (1997), 110–143.
32
Heidegger (1994), 34.
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modern technological machinery only “stands” or works as such “when it goes.”33
If the machine is out of order, if requisite parts are missing, it is worse than nothing
and now we are back to the sheerly present at hand (or the irremediably present at
hand in the case of those old power cords that connect to appliances or tools one no
longer has). Here Heidegger is concerned to attend to the ordering of both the
machine and the mechanical network into which it is set just in order that it might
be a mechanism of this or that kind. Thus as noted, he also gives the example of the
automobile, pointing out that the automobile is more than a tool made of separable
parts into which it can be broken down and out of which it can be assembled but
exemplifies modern technology to the extent that its use, and intriguingly this has
been the subject of several politically theoretic studies of technology, requires an
entire schema, a constellation or network, all of it sine qua non. This is not merely
a matter of fuel and and a network of fuel stations, of building a network of roads
for automotive use and redesigning entire downtown urban areas to include parking garages and highways that pass over or pass through a city and so on. Thus
Langdon Winner and others talk about the concerted efforts in the early decades of
the last century to demolish street cars and established forms or networks of public
transport to shift consumers of public transportation, which cost whatever it cost
for a ticket, to consumers of private transportation which required a whole lot more
in the way of direct and indirect costs.34
Private vs. public transportation underlines Heidegger’s point. Hitler built the
Autobahn and his system of roads (still a fetish factor in Germany—Freie Fahrt für
freie Burger, where the emphasis is on free, meaning no speed-limit) was as beneficial for the nation in peacetime as in wartime. Thus Heidegger can remind his
Bremen businessmen that unlike the jug that he uses to illustrate the thing in his first
lecture, the automobile does not “just” stand there even when it is parked. Instead it
is “at the ready,” precisely available for use in every potential or possible sense.
Hence the automobile, and by extension, the truck for industrial transportation “is
able to be challenged forth precisely for a further transport, which itself sets in place
the promotion”—and in good, Rotary Club, English we might prefer to say that this
potential to be challenged forth drives the wheels—“of commerce”35
Here Heidegger goes on to clarify the way in which we are today set up, as it
were, to be consumers of precisely the technological schema or framework or, to
use Jacques Ellul’s term for the very same thing, the technological system, because
the point concerning technology is that there is no having of it by halves. You cannot
opt out, you cannot take it or leave it—the later Heidegger—Heidegger III we could
say—suggests in his Discourse on Thinking that we might do a kind of zen thing
with technology, a kind of mindfulness he called Gelassenheit, but like zen and like

33

Ibid.
Langdon Winner offers a discussion of this point along with a number of references to classical
political studies of the shift from public to private transport on the eastern and western seaboards
in Winner (1986).
35
Heidegger (1994), 35.
34

Constellating Technology: Heidegger’s Die Gefahr/The Danger

163

mindfulness (Heidegger called this thinking), Gelassenheit turns out to be more
elusive or harder than it sounds.
For Heidegger, “the forester who surveys the wood to be felled”—the line here
is reproduced in its entirety in “The Question Concerning Technology”—traces
and does not trace the path followed by his grandfather just to the extent that the
wood he cuts is ordered, set up for and into the lumber industry which is ordered
or fit into producing “cellulose stock” for the paper industry which in turn is set up
for delivery “to the newspapers and tabloids that impose themselves on the public
sphere in ordered to be devoured by it.”36 If the Frankfurt School were not disposed
to reject everything Heidegger notes (after all Horkheimer would still have all the
priority one might wish) there is a useful critical analysis in the next paragraph,
which does not indeed appear to the same extent in the later essay The Question
Concerning Technology. Thus Heidegger here touches upon themes echoing those
of Horkheimer and Adorno in their own 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment—elements
of which grew out of Adorno’s work, begun in 1941 on Lazarsfeld’s Princeton
radio project37—along with Friedrich Georg Jünger as well as Herbert Marcuse, in
addition to Günther Anders (the stepchild of the Frankfurt School) as indeed
Rudolf Arnheim, points also approached from a different point of view by Edward
Bernays and Vance Packard.38
The point is media, and Heidegger goes on to talk about radio and film in order
to explain the very way that the human being him- or herself is disposed of, imposed
upon, precisely with respect to his or her disposition as such:
Radio and film belong to the standing reserve of this commandeering [of the human being]
through which the public sphere [Offentlichkeit] is set up, challenged forth, and thereby
installed in the first place.39

For Heidegger, this is not merely the work of the “radio broadcast advisory council” but is already at hand in “the standing reserve called the radio, i.e., challenged
forth to the ordering of the broadcast industry.”40
My point is to call attention to a remark that Heidegger offers in a phrase uncannily similar to Adorno’s physiognomic observation regarding the twirling of the
36
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radio dial but also in a context akin to the “homeworker” analysis that would be
offered by Günther Anders in 1956, which piecework manufacturing in turn produces or generates the media consumer qua media consumer, a point to be taken up
by the Canadian media-political theorist Dallas Smythe, arguing and in the process
explaining why commercial broadcast access is of value to manufacturers, that, in
Heidegger’s words here
every radio listener who turns its dial is insulated as part of the component character
of the parts of the standing reserve, locked in as a piece of the standing reserve, in
which he remains confined even if he still thinks he is utterly free to turn the device on
and off.41

Paralleling his trademark tool example, Heidegger observes that even if one were
to turn off the radio, one would remain connected or bound to it. Indeed as I have
argued to be typical for Heidegger’s style of intensification, he emphasizes the point
with an iconically philosophical thought example: were a cosmic miracle suddenly
to silence all radio broadcasts, so Heidegger argues, the very same connection
would still persist.42 On this extreme supposition, even if:
suddenly everywhere on earth in everyplace, radio receivers were to disappear—who could
comprehend the cluelessness, the boredom, the emptiness that would at a blow assault the
human being and thoroughly unhinge their routine affairs.43

This is also, though that is a paper of its own, the reason for Heidegger’s extended
reflection on what is involved when a particular tract of land is challenged forth to
produce coal, which is in turn demanded by the electrical industry which itself
deploys a massive set up just to be able to convert coal into steam, into power for
industrial and private use. Heidegger uses this example because such industries
and their interconnections (especially all the details we tend not to think about)
were transparent to him as they were to every German, every Frenchman, etc., etc.,
after the war. Thus the competing desire to use land for mining (raw materials)
clashed with the need to use land for agriculture (foodstuffs), but the technization of
both handcrafts, only meant that the one application namely mining or as we call it
today: land use development, demanded vastly more land than ever before, and the
second application, farming, also took more land in its mechanized variety than had
been traditionally needed.
But the economics of competing land applications and how they might be parceled
out and to which interest groups concerned Heidegger less than the very complicated array or constellation of modern scientific, technologized industry as such.
41
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Thus in addition to his coal example, or airplane example (in the original lecture as
we have just cited it, he talks about automotive components packed for export as
items of so much standing reserve—present at hand we could say—and parking lots
and highways, as components of the automotive industry, all very patently ready to
hand). Likewise as also noted, Heidegger focusses on forestry, the woodsman today
as compared to his forebears and with that he is off with a discussion of forest management practices, which means harvesting, i.e., cutting down the trees for the sake
of and exactly as cued to the needs of other industries as we have just detailed these:
like the enormous need for paper after the war, be it for planning or for journalism,
which industry also catches Heidegger’s attention as it is this same industry (this is
the point he makes about radio) includes human beings who are themselves parts of
this same industry, ordered into it, set up into it, to the extent that both paper journalism and radio are so many culture industries to use the language that Horkheimer
and Adorno and Anders also employ to speak of these media enterprises, as such
public industries, as Heidegger explains, are used to direct or set up the “public
sphere” so that it may be challenged forth and ordered, i.e., so that public or political
planning can proceed according to political design. Indeed as Heidegger certainly
knew—the political fate of Germany depended upon it—such public sphere planning was quite explicitly at issue. The question at hand was at the time: what kind
of government would rebuild the country? What direction would it take?44 If it can
be argued that in West Germany, excluding socialism would have to be politically
overdetermined, Marx himself had offered serious critiques of the kind of advantage
capitalism takes in the time of crisis and had already analysed that the only efficiency served was that of profit. Heidegger makes this point in his own lectures, an
emphasis repeated in his “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,”45 which was of course all
about the urgent misery of the housing crisis, which was also at the time a food
crisis and his “Letter on Humanism” culminates with references, among other
things, to Marx, as we note by considering his contrast between thinking and doing,
contending that “thinking is a deed” and continuing by emphasizing such a deed
“also surpasses all praxis.”46 For Heidegger, however the thought in question, the
‘understanding’ of the world that Marx had famously attributed to all philosophy
heretofore in his Theses on Feuerbach, would not be marked by anything like “the
grandeur of its achievements” or indeed efficacy as such “but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment.”47 Here in the Letter on Humanism, and
presumably Heidegger would have known exactly what he was saying by writing
this, the conclusion points to the same constellation of philosophy as a project of
understanding the world or changing it, and Heidegger suggests that theory itself
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can use a bit of reflection on itself and what it is capable of: “It is time to break the
habit of overestimating philosophy.”48
The problem here is already one I have been framing out: that is the problem of
the Ge-Stell as this parallels the frames set up to re-build houses or indeed cathedrals in Freiburg as the cathedral there was damaged during the war49—if you visit
and climb to the top you can see that the Freiburg residents set a plaque to thank the
stones, as it were, for not falling. And to be sure, as those of us who live in the city
know all too well, once a scaffolding goes up around a building to repair it or what
have you, its durability seems guaranteed.50 The scaffolding, the framework, the set
up, is not only indispensable but all-pervasive.
Thus when we read the essay Das Ge-stell, the set up or the setting up, you can
also say the enframing (I have already noted that my concerns about ‘the positionality,’ just to the extent that it can sound like a Kama Sutra move or some Deepak
Chopra trademarked approach to heated or Bikram yoga), or indeed when we read
Die Gefahr, we are confronted with Heidegger’s most notorious comments on the
technized transforms of industry and its consequences. Heidegger looks at what the
mechanization of anything and everything does, and points out that it does not fail
to affect us in the most basic way.
Thus Heidegger writes about the requisitioning and planning that characterized a
wartime and a postwar Nachkriegszeit Germany, and he would certainly know about
both as he himself (qua dispensable) had been set into, conscripted into service at
the end of the war. For in wartime everything was placed at the disposal of this kind
of ordering and everything came to be regarded, this is the effect of the transformation of this kind of ordering, as so much standing reserve. We even may remember,
it’s a postmodern meme, and certainly my grandparents would have remembered,
various wartime advertisements encouraging the average American to do his or her
“part” during the second world war. Now we already know from reading Marx’s
Capital if we did not know it from Adam Smith or others that just such a transformation of nature and human relations is the heart of economic ordering. All the war
shows, as if it had needed to be shown, is the calculation of the same order and the
details of dependencies. The things one tends not to notice (that the amount of wood
that will be needed to be managed in the Black Forest will be directly dependent
upon the proliferation of journalism and propaganda and information tracts—pick
your euphemism—so that, once again, rather than serving the lumber industry the
woodsman is more accurately or actually serving the pamphlet or leaflet industry)
and such superficially counter-intuitive relations were made more transparent in the
years during and especially after the war. This way of commandeering the resources
48
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of the world for such further purposes “endures” and Jacques Ellul will take a leaf
from Heidegger (and Friedrich Georg Jünger) to insist on what he calls the “autonomy” of technology and technique, noting that once it is set in motion, today’s
modern technology cannot be arrested. It might perhaps, and however unlikely, be
diverted, but never simply stopped.
For Heidegger this setting up endures insofar as the set up is in turn imposed for
the sake of other purposes, to which it is ordered (raw materials are raw materials
for something, although and of course they can be stockpiled more generically
within that same framework). Deployment or utilization “sets everything up in
advance such that what is set up conduces to success ….But the resultant is arranged
as success beforehand.”51 And for Heidegger the resultant schema cannot but be
self-reinforcing, and what is defined as “success,” as he goes on to elaborate this, “is
that kind of resultant that is itself allied to the production of further results. We call
it ordering/requisitioning/com-portment [das Be-Stellen].”52
For Heidegger, and if this were another paper, I might go in another direction,
there is a difference between the kind of productivity of the village carpenter (we
began by noting that Heidegger’s father was one such) who might make or produce
a table or who might for another purpose, make a coffin, a Todtenbaum, which itself
would be destined, fitted not into the productive time and cares of the carpenter’s
industry but into another schema of another kind of temporality and care—here
Heidegger uses the language of the cares or concerns of Being and Time—and that
means into the constellation and intimate engagements of another world that is not
the world of the manufacturer’s workshop but the different world directionalities
and setting of the “peasant’s farm, the house and the land, the ones who dwell there,
their kin, and the neighborhood.”53
There is no connection with any of that today, and intriguingly, we can cross the
distance in time between Heidegger’s 1950 lecture and 2013 without needing to
change a thing. The “mechanized burial industry of the metropolis”54 as Heidegger
goes on to say by contrast does not lend itself to peasant rituals, themes or terminology. And if you want to see a French take on some of that, I recommend the climax
of the wonderfully existentialist (not existential) 1986 film by Claude Berri, Jean de
Florette when Jean (Gérard Depardieu in perhaps his most sympathetic role) is
destroyed by his own techne (his dynamite) and his lack of techne (peasant experience) and above all by the failure of techne as what Aristotle named phronesis which
would be knowing the difference between the two (that said, the technological critique of Jean de Florette is more Jacques Ellul than Martin Heidegger).
Comparing in a swift analogy the peasant’s placing of his ox, positioning the animal in his traces just so, in order to advance the work he needs to get out of the ox,
Heidegger writes that “Men and women must report themselves to a work service
[Arbeitsdienst]. They are conscripted. They are met by a constellation [Stellen] that
51
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places them, i.e., commandeers them.”55 Heidegger thus goes into, as is his wont as
we recognize this strategy from Being and Time to the later work on language, the
meaning of the word, asking what das Ge-Stell means and and answering “to place,
to position, to set’” so as to experience what comes to pass in that requisitioning and
accountability through which a given stock arises and is thus a standing reserve.
Heidegger’s analysis concerns civilian conscription, during and after a war on
the most human level, whereby what is deployed are human beings as troops contra
human beings as troops and of course and most lamentably contra those civilians
who happen to be the enemy, and as part of that the requisitioning of whatever is at
hand for the purposes of war. Like those summoned to do their part during war,
Heidegger’s point is that the approach is a total one, and there are parallels with
Friedrich Georg Jünger, not unlike the parallels Walter Benjamin draws out in his
reflection on the world of art in the age of technological reproduction with regard
to the consequences of the first world war, when Benjamin cites the Futurist
Manifesto of the Italian artisti, Marinetti in his own reflections.56 As Benjamin then
goes on to explain the object contradiction that is the work of art as such:
the aesthetic of modern warfare appears as follows: if the natural use of productive forces
is impeded by the property system, then the increase in technological means, in speed, in
sources of energy will press toward an unnatural use. This is found in war, and the
destruction caused by war furnishes proof that society was not mature enough to make
technology its organ, that technology was not sufficiently developed to master the elemental
forces of society.57

Benjamin continues by invoking what appears to be the fascist aesthetic, the
aesthetics of pure politics: “Fiat ars—pereat mundus” and he explains this is as a
direct consequence of technology and points out, too flatly for the nuanced sensibilities of a Horkheimer: “This is evidently the consummation of l’art pour l’art.”58
Invoking the cliché sublime converted here into the art-spectacular of a humanity
converted from divine object to a subject absorbed with “its own annihilation as a
supreme aesthetic pleasure,” we are still far from thinking through the caesura, the
space between the themes of his conclusion: “Such is the aestheticizing of politics,
as practiced by fascism. Communism replies by politicizing art.”59
To bring the point from a period after the first world war to Heidegger’s time
after the second world war (and still to this day, however we wish to understand 9/11
and the war on Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and so on, and however we wish to
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understand the Keystone Pipeline to the US coast or the relentlessly stupid use of
fracking), Heidegger points to these everyday circumstances and these everyday
ontic consequences when he observes that “a tract of land is coopted, namely for the
coal and ore that subsists in it.”60
This notion of cooption and it should be clear here that Heidegger is talking
about newly requisitioned tracts, newly requisitioned by the Nazis and then again
in the postwar era, rather than offering some merely nostalgic musings in praise
of the farmer’s traditional field. For us today and to be sure, all this is a matter of
‘development,’ one thereby sets up a coal or another mining industry (we can
add, if we like, that just such cooption sets up a fracking industry for extracting
natural gas, requiring the use of vast quantities of fresh water, yet further evidence of the ‘perfection’ of technique in Jünger’s sense as the engineering science of fracking requires pure rather than ‘recycled’ water, which is then an
industry, paralleling Heidegger’s awful agricultural example, that is/becomes an
industry for the production of contaminated aquifers along with the production
of contaminated soil and of course—because we are talking about gas—the production of polluted and poisoned air). In this way or “through such requisitioning
[Bestellen] the land becomes a coal reserve, the soil a mineral deposit.”
Immediately contrasting this with the farmer’s practice with respect to the land
and to nature, as a kind of allowing, this is the meaning of Gelassenheit, “the
crops to grow as nature itself allows,”61 Heidegger thus seeks to raise the question concerning the difference made by modern technology in this contrasting
opposition, and here we need the entire quote
In the meantime, however, even the tending of the fields [die Feldbestellung] has gone over
to the same re-quisitioning [Be-Stellen] that imposes upon the air for nitrogen, the soil for
coal and ore, the ore for uranium, the uranium for atomic energy, and the latter for destruction on command.62

The lineage traced is that of modern technology and the efficiency of a
technological world order. Everything is regarded, and we know this, we take this
for granted, for the purposes of development, by which we mean if we are doing
development studies: technological orderability or usability in the same schema or
setup. Everything fits into this frame and there is no outside. If Marx saw the
dynamic of the machine as reducing the needed labor of the worker to no more than
an appendage, a fitted extra, and thus the stupidification of the human as a necessary
part of capital and its mechanized deployment, as part of the complex relation of the
human being to nature within the sane very material dialectic, Nietzsche himself
points to a similarly coordinate structure when he argued that we humanize nature
and everything else by cutting it to our measure (these are the “bounds” of sense in
Nietzsche’s articulation of the critique of reason in the third book of The Gay
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Science) but also as he goes on in On the Genealogy of Morals to highlight the
numbing of the mind that, as he teased, is called “the blessing of work.”63
Still it is one thing again to guess at the brutalizing direction of technology, and
Nietzsche’s language of the “God of machines and smelting pots,”64 seems to capture the high regard we have for the priests of the same god, the engineers and
technicians and indeed the scientists and theorists of all kinds. By contrast, and this
is where the practical level, the ontic matters of the ordinary come into play, it is
quite another thing again to live through the pains of such a transformation of the
world in the image of technology, as Heidegger lived through this transfiguration,
through two world wars, even if one could argue that we are today still, as we are,
and not that we give it a thought, living through wars all the same. For the work of
this transfiguring force is now largely consummate and we ignore, we do not live
through, the wars we have consistently been fighting. If Heidegger could ask if the
victims relegated to annihilation camps ‘died’ or if (and let us not forget that for
Heidegger the word and the meaning of the word in each case makes all the difference) they did not much rather and simply ‘perish’? The word he uses, the technical
term as historians also use it, is liquidation. And whatever fate that is, what it is not,
what does not have a chance to touch it (and those so condemned are bereft of
exactly this on Heidegger’s account) is death: a death, and above all, not one’s own
death: a death that one might take up, or and this is pure luxury, as we see, refuse to
appropriate, refuse to live. The inauthentic death is also what one does not die in
such camps.
For our part, we also ignore, as Baudrillard argued that we should not but that we
cannot but fail to see, the political realm, which “political” we take to be all about
what the journalism cum culture industry serves up to us.65 Baudrillard’s term was
‘integrated reality,’ which we ought today rename embedded reality, all the while
unaware of what really happened to close down the OWS movement (New York
City, after all, is where it began) and it is worth noting that I offered an earlier talk
scheduled during the events of the original Occupy Wall Street66 to the same group
at the New School that initially invited me to give the talk on which the current
essay is based. Here what matters with this detail and allusion to “real life” is that
we scholars and citizens, journalists and consumers barely notice today that Wall
Street is no longer “occupied,” and we do not bother to attend to such routine and
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such ontic details unless a Facebook post is sufficiently annoying to compel us to do
so, likewise we are oblivious to our torture of our prisoners as we still detain them
in Guantanamo, all that after electing a president on the explicit mandate that such
detention centers follow the rule of law (hasn’t happened and we elected that same
president again, anyway), and we certainly think nothing of the overkill (tanks in the
street, martial law, the complete shutdown of the town) required to catch two college
students in Boston (called terrorists), killing one and leaving another at least initially unable to speak (Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics goes on at length about the
fortune of that circumstantiality): we as a media populace followed the manhunt in
Boston with the avidity usually reserved for a contest on American Idol. Politics for
us, as Baudrillard wrote again and again, alas with Gallic impenetrability, is all
about the issues that are presented to us as news.67 History may well tell a different
story, but this is doubtful, and this too was also Baudrillard’s point, Kittler’s too
when he could turn his attention from his Greeks and other dissipations.68 After
everything is digitized which means to be sure, after every record can be infinitely
revised or changed at will—according to whoever’s whim, whatever, the point to be
remembered (no one will be able to make it) is that no one will be able to demonstrate/prove/notice the effects or consequences of such limitless alterability (this is
the real meaning of the Leibnizian difference that makes no difference).
Yet one should be skeptical: we remain in need of a critical theory for our times
and the current practitioners of the same, be they in Frankfurt or New York or
Chicago, have fallen silent on anything that resembles critique. And these titulary
practitioners control all the journals (Critical Theory, Constellations, etc.) and they
control all the fellowships and they control all the books that are published in supposedly respectable presses. And did I say professorial posts too? No, because I did
not have to: this goes without saying.
Repeated twice in these two core lectures, Das Ge-Stell and Die Gefahr,
which may now be taken as the locus of Heidegger’s abyssal politics, is (again)
his un-speakable, claim about death and technology and we have heard about this
and about its untenability all our intellectual lives. The most incendiary locus for
this twice-repeated provocation might be as expressed in Das Ge-Stell. This is
the locus that one scholar quoted out of context after gaining access to the thennot-yet published text (this is the fun of plundering archives, not that there are all
that many chances for those doing archival work to do comparable things), after
promising not to quote it out of context. But by breaking a promise (and one
makes such promises in order to break them, as Kant tells us, namely as we seek
to gain an advantage and because we know or tell ourselves that without just that
false promise, breaking in our unsovereign mouths, as Nietzsche says calling us
windbags, even as we utter it [this is the point of the aphorism on the Nietzsche’s
‘sovereign individual at the start of the second part of On the Genealogy of
67
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Morals]), that same advantage is denied us. The advantage won by Wolfgang
Schirmacher yielded the quote that generated a small book industry, large if you
count Wolin, huge if you count Tom Rockmore’s books, which is of course the
Heidegger scandal, beginning with Levinas, Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida, Habermas
too.69 In fact Heidegger makes two similar declarations, but the first one is the
most notorious and it runs as follows
Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry in essence the same as the production of
corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and
starving of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs.70

All of these things, for Heidegger, hence our horror, in essence: the same. For
Heidegger this sameness is so because it cannot but be so: everything is drawn into
the gyre, the “centre cannot hold” indeed we need the whole array of Yeats’ rebuke
of historicity and modern fatefulness or futurity because the essence of modern
technology in our world happens to remain as that which Heidegger saw it as being,
and to which insight into that which is, he sought to call our attention.
The setting upon of modern technology is critical, crucial, indispensable for
Heidegger and that is how he can utter such an offensive comparison: for him
modern technology is all about such equations, such calculations, such reductions.
Thus we noted with respect to a different kind of land-use, switching agrarian
land over, opening it up, literally so, to the coal industry, that Heidegger writes that
with that the coal itself (he has the Rilkean poem to the wealth of the kings slumbering in the mountains in his mind), is ordered, set upon: “challenged forth for heat,
as the ground is challenged forth for coal.” Here the constellating point in question
will be that heat itself, today we would say energy,
is already set to set up steam, the pressure of which drives the turbines, which keep a factory
productive, which is itself ordered to set in place machines that produce tools by means of
which again, machines are set to work and maintained.71

The subsequent and for environmental studies indispensable reflective array to
which Heidegger then turns only offers an elaboration of this point:
The hydroelectric plant is placed in the river. It imposes upon it for water pressure,
which sets the turbines turning, the turning of which drives the machines, the gearing of
which imposes upon the electrical current through which the long-distance power centers
and their electrical grid are positioned for the conducting of electricity. The power
station in the Rhine river, the dam, the turbines, the generators, the switchboard, the
electrical grid—all this and more is there only insofar as it stands in place and at the ready,
not in order to be there (presence), but to be positioned, and indeed solely to impose
upon still others.72
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Heidegger could not understand the engineering array or constellation any better,
maybe this what our culture industry means when it praises German engineering to
this day, usually in a Volkswagen ad or just an advertisement for a coffee machine.
Heidegger goes on to notice that this includes human being in deep ways and he
speaks of the machination, “mechanization of the human,”73 “the human being is
ordered by and for the requisitioning.”74
All this can seem to be taking us rather far afield, and as Das Ge-Stell serves as
prelude to Heidegger’s lecture on Die Gefahr, we turn to consider, as promised,
Heidegger’s reflection on the Ge.
We name the collection of mountains [die Versammlung der Berge] that are already gathered together, united of themselves and never in retrospect, the mountain range [das
Gebirge]. We name the collection of ways according to which we are disposed to such and
such, and can feel ourselves so disposed, our frame of mind [das Gemut]. We now named
the self-gathered collection of placing, setting [das Stellens], wherein everything orderable
essences in the standing reserve, das Ge-Stell.75

Here for Heidegger everything is harrowed, harvested, arranged, disposed to
standing reserve and industry, and in this sense he can claim that “das Ge-Stell is the
essence of technology.”76

1.1

Die Gefahr/The Danger

As is typical for Heidegger, as we already know if we have learned to follow the
rhetorical didacticism that characterizes the strategic articulations of Being and
Time, Heidegger repeats the moves he introduces in Das Ge-Stell in the following
lecture Die Gefahr, and he does so in a thoroughly scholastic fashion. To be sure,
the reason that Jack Caputo and others can undertake to read Heidegger and Aquinas
together is because of Heidegger’s scholastic formation, not unlike Kant’s own formation and indeed and to be sure as Heidegger admires Kant throughout his life.77
Here Heidegger closes his fourth lecture on the turn by invoking Kant on the ultimate practical question, the ground of being qua being and as such: that would be
God even for the godless, as (the believing) Kant himself is usually blamed for
being the instigator of nihilism, at least according to Fichte and Jacobi.78 For his
part, Kant was already writing in a godless time, after Newton, after Laplace’s
73
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Mécanique Céleste (finished in 1725, Kant would draw upon this for his own nebular hypothesis in 1755), and Heidegger’s schoolman’s (and hence classically didicatic strategy) is simply to tell us what he is doing and then to do so and then to
reprise what it is that he has done.79 In this sense “The Turn” inevitably has nothing
to do with the way typical Heideggerians seeking to divide their bit of Heidegger
into something manageable tend to speak of it, as if there might be a change in
Heidegger’s thinking (Heidegger as we know is famous for saying that a thinker
thinks only one thought), and we have already noted that where we might need to
locate such a change or turn we do not need to wait for these lectures for it is already
noted in Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (and it is of course albeit in a secret, esoteric, or unpublished way already present in the Beiträge).80 In the Letter on
Humanism Heidegger declares that “everything is reversed,”81 or turned around, but
scholars will find such a translation or reflexive turning in his Introduction to
Metaphysics, or indeed in the 1935 lectures on The Origin of the Work of Art, which
are themselves, as they have to do with nothing other than the Greek notion or
meaning of techne, likewise indispensable for the four lectures on technology.
The focus on calculation with which Heidegger ends his lecture on Das Ge-Stell
is replaced with a reflection on worlding in terms that we recognize as the terms of
the fourfold, and which if we keep Heidegger’s reflections on the happening or
event of truth in his lecture on the artwork highlights “worlding” coming to
presence:
World is the fourfold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. In the uniting whole of its
presence, the mirrorplay of the fourfold guards everything that thingingly presences and
absences between the four.82

As we also recognize from Being and Time, Heidegger gives nothing—he is not
a Hegelian, as it happens, for nothing—without simultaneously also taking it away.
Thus after indicating the importance of the safeguard, of sheltering (and we recall
that this is at the heart of his reflections on physis), Heidegger observes that “The
world still refuses itself as world. World still withdraws into the concealment proper
to it.”83 The difficulty for any discussion here as we recognize this immediately from
our familiarity with Being and Time but also from our rather persistent unfamiliarity
with Heidegger’s 1930 Essence of Truth, is that we are confounded by lighting and
concealing, showing hiding, aletheia/lethe.
The problem as Heidegger writes here, nicely concisely, is that “aletheia does
not properly guard itself in its own essence it lapses into concealment, lethe,
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aletheia falls into forgetfulness.”84 By this means to be sure, Heidegger both
introduces the danger qua danger as well as recuperating his own reflection on the
sheer forgottenness of being which he has in the interim (as we know from the
Beiträge) begun to write as Seyn.
What Heidegger here calls the “refusal” of world, which he expresses as the Ereignis,
happening or event, also sometimes rendered as “appropriation” “ Diese Ereignis
besteht darin das Welt als die Wahrnis des Wesens des Seins sich verweigert.”85
World thus refuses itself as the preserver, guardian, harborer of the essence of
Being. Heidegger now offers us two references to temporality, one to the then-current
dispensation of world-affairs, as the “unfolding of planetary totality,” observing as
the defeated party to the previous contest for world-domination (i.e., the Germans
as the losers in the second world war) could not but be, however awkwardly,
perfectly placed to observe that “the modern battle for mastery of the earth is
concentrated upon the position of the two contemporary ‘world’ ‘powers.” (51)
This is complicated to the extent that Heidegger coordinates the refusal of world as
manifest as eventuated via or through the defenseless of the thing noting that in this
relation one to another they are “the same if to be sure not the identical.” (Ibid.) But
the distinction is not idle for Heidegger: “the same [das Selbe],” he will go on to
emphasize “is never the identical [das Gleiche].” (52) At this point what is at issue
for Heidegger is the refusal of world and the vulnerability of the thing in the prevailing turn of the set up he has analysed as modern technology. Everything but everything is presented as the ordered ‘items at hand’ or standing currency of standing
reserve. “Ge-Stell” he writes adumbrated in this play on standing reserve “is” this
disposition and is accordingly “the essence of modern technology.” (51) But this
conjunction is one of the moment, the present time, the insight is into that which is,
in its immediacy, thus Heidegger goes on to observe that this holds not ‘as such’ or
‘from all time’ but very literally ‘here,’ just to the extent that it is here and now that
we find that the “oblivion of the essence of being is consummate.” In the same way,
and now we see why so many commentators inevitably turn here to a reflection on
The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger also writes that “World and Ge-Stell are
the same.” (52)
Calculation, a concern for Heidegger from the start, both in his reflections on
truth in Being and Time as in the Essence of Truth, as in his reflections on “Science
and World Picture,” all originating from his original and enduring interest in
science and his interest, inevitable for anyone who works on Dilthey’s account of
history but also anyone in philosophy who is both a contemporary as Heidegger
was, roughly speaking here, as you are whether you like it or not as students a
contemporary of my ancient self just as I was when I was a 23 year old student
when I met first met William Richardson as well as being the contemporary of my
even more ancient teacher, the same Gadamer at 80, so similarly was Heidegger a
contemporary of Max Weber as well as from its outset to its flourishing with the
same Rudolf Carnap we already began by noticing, and beyond to its current
84
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world-dominion within philosophy proper in so-called analytic philosophy, logical
positivism, the issue of values was for Heidegger a matter of weighting and weighing the same. We cannot count the time of life with a clock, we cannot calculate it
at all. Thus Heidegger writes, playing on the banality of banality, the indifference
of the diffident—Alles gilt gleich—same old, same old, we might say. (52)
If a further discussion of calculation cannot here be considered, what is important
to note is that the same preface, the Ge- that remains at issue, is also to be considered in the danger, die Ge-fahr. Two coordinate and even nested claims make this
clear: “The essence of technology is the Ge-Stell. The essence of the Ge-Stell is the
danger.” (54) In effect, it is the Ge-Stell as such, the enframing, the set up that “sets
after the truth of the essence of being with forgetfulness.” (53) This harrying, harrowing is Heidegger’s “pur-suit’—here the word is not Gestellen, but Nachstellen.
For Heidegger, as he writes, in “Old High German, to pursue is called fara.” (53)
The Ge-Stell, the set-up, or the en-framing “gathered in itself as pursuit is the danger [Das in sich gesammelte Stellen als Nachstellen ist die Gefahr].” (53) What is
key here just as in the folded, referentiality or integral orderedness of the Ge- in
Ge-Stell, is the gathered in itself of the pursuit in question, as the danger. The
Hegelian move here brings us him to reflect “that Beyng (Being or Sein spelled with
a y, in an ancient mode, as Seyn) is the danger. Beyng is unqualifiedly in itself, from
itself, for itself” (can’t get more Hegelian than this) “the danger. As this pursuit,
which pursues its own essence with the forgetting of this essence”—here, again, we
recognize aletheia—“beyng as beyng is the danger.” (53)
Here Heidegger’s definition of the danger summarizes the lectures to this point:
The danger is the collected pursuit [sich in sich versammelte Stellen als Nachstellen] as
which en-framing/set up [als welches das Ge-Stell] in the guise of unguardedness of the
thing, pursues the self-refusal of world with the forgetting of its truth.” (54)

For Heidegger, and note that our reading through an English language lens
challenges us, we are left to reflect that we do not experience [Erfahren] the danger
as danger.” (55) It is in this context that Heidegger presents the currency of need and
desperation, that is: he lists a litany of death, as indeed of pain that is to say suffering, and also of poverty, all and each as what confronts us and at the same time
manages not to touch us, leaving us unmoved, unchanged, in a terrifying sense. The
phenomenon to which Heidegger refers here continues to this day as we well know,
all you have to do is read the paper, check Facebook and note how many awful
things and then note how little any of those things affect you really or at all: talk
about the oblivion of being as much as you like.
For Heidegger in the midst of extraordinary need and desperation, and from 1945
onward, certainly unabated by 1949 in Germany, that is then pretty much everywhere
in that defeated land, precisely to the extent that the businessmen and city fathers to
whom Heidegger spoke in Bremen, just to the degree that they did indeed address this
need and that need, as people organized to respond to devastations in this way and
that, remedying problems in this way and that, that precisely in the midst of “ameliorating pain and tending to neediness” (55–56) what remains critical for Heidegger is
that precisely while so engaged “one does not attend to the need.” (65) Heidegger has
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a name for this—which he explores already in Being and Time, errancy, die Irre.86 It
is our amazing ability not to be where we are, which (remember that we are for
Heidegger Dasein), only means that we are not who we are. In this sense, Heidegger
observes here, „Das Wesen der Irre beruht im Wesen des Seyns als der Gefahr.” [The
essence of errancy subsists in the essence of Seyn as the danger.] (56)
This same errancy plagues us when in the same paradoxical sense in which the
paradox of neediness prevails such that we all have needs, we all have our desperations, but we do not in midst of our worries actually because we cannot begin to
attend to needfulness as such. In the context of this reflection on death, suffering or
pain and neediness or needfulness and all the heedlessness of the same in the midst
of an abundance of the same, we encounter the second version, or variant upon
Heidegger’s seeming insensitivity (which we now see to be an insensitivity in his
words on insensitivity as we hear him). This locus, situated in postwar needfulness,
is the most grim, and it is perhaps because of its time, harsher in tone than
Heidegger’s more popular (it was a radio) lecture “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,”
broadcast in 1951 with its own respective (and indeed more hopeful) reflections on
need and needfulness. Here in The Danger we read:
Hundreds of thousands die in masses. Do they die? They succumb. They are put down. Do
they die? They become inventory items of a standing reserve for the fabrication of corpses.
Do they die? They are unremarkably liquidated in annihilation camps. And even without
such—millions now in China, end pathetically in starvation. (56)

In this context, it can be argued that the Heidegger of Being and Time thereby
reclaims his own reflection on what he had offered for reflection on death, that is
being-towards-death, as this specifically characterizes human beings in their mortality, as beings concerned with their being and aware of their vulnerability in being
in the mode (this is high Heidegger, esoteric Heidegger) of disattending, flight, forgetfulness of being.
Death shelters [birgt] the essence of being. Death is the highest re-fuge [Gebirg] of the truth
of being itself, the refuge that in itself shelters [birgt] the concealment [Verborgenheit] of
the essence of being and gathers together the sheltering [bergung] of its essence.… To be
capable of death in its essence means to be able to die. (Ibid.)

But for Heidegger: “The human is not yet the mortal.” (56) Since much of
Heidegger’s project in Being and Time was all about explaining life in terms of living and in terms of the vanity of mortal beings who take themselves to be immortal,
as we do, proximally and for the most part, what fascism took from its others was
what made them human, even in its constant, as it is pretty much always, default.
Here I want to emphasize as this essay moves toward its conclusion that the same
technique, the same modus, asks us to attend to Heidegger’s very overtly hermeneutic
phenomenology (he is not—despite the Spiegel’s sensationalist insistence on the
same, an insistence shared by numerous junior college professors—an ‘existentialist’)
with respect to our obliviousness, thoughtlessness. “Immeasurable suffering shifts
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and surges across the earth. But the essence of pain conceals itself. …Everywhere we
are besieged with countless and boundless suffering. We however are not pained
[schmerzlos], we are not appropriated to the essence of pain.”(57)
We are not pained and today there is more of this un-moved, painlessness than
ever. Who bothers to watch animal rights videos, if one ever did, who is really concerned about the plight or fate (pick any word you like) of the Palestinians, the
Syrians, the Nigerians, etc. and etc. and etc.?
Death, the mountains of Seyn, pain, the schema of Seyn, poverty, the liberation into the
ownership of Seyn, are features allowing the danger to be remarked, that needfulness is
excluded in the midst of the greatest neediness, that the danger is not as the danger allowing
the danger to be noted. (Ibid.)

We are unpained, we do not sense what is all around us, as Heidegger who will
turn in his last essay on the turn to language by which as he explains he means our
need to lay claim to it. And today, I would argue, we are no further advanced: we
still need to recall Hölderlin’s warning to us, whether as scholars of being or of
language as all those who have lost their tongues in foreign (and native) lands.
Here Heidegger seeks to differentiate his reading from those who contend that
“technology is the catastrophe of the modern world” (58) and so on. For Heidegger
it is already problematic to offer a critique of technology in a technological age, no
matter in what voice one seeks to do so. The point here is that whether one praises
or damns it, “at the same time one greedily scurries after the latest technological
advance, perhaps one cannot but run after it in this way.” (58) Yet to this same extent
“judgment and inclination with respect to technology contradict themselves and the
same contradiction is taken as objection.” (Ibid.)
Heidegger’s perhaps best known claim that the “essence of technology is itself
nothing technological” (60) remains, as he reprises it in the final lecture, The Turn,
almost in the same words, arguing that everything that is “merely technical” can
“never attain to the essence of technology” (Die Kehre, 76). We do not grasp and
hence cannot begin to articulate what he calls the “insight into that which is,” to the
extent that we do not even ask after the import of the times as they unfold around us.
“But,” for Heidegger, “we do not yet hear, we, under the dominion of technology,
whose hearing and seeing decay through radio and film.” (Die Kehre, 77) Here we
can and should add the internet (why on earth not?), but for Heidegger what we do
not yet hearken to or see is occluded not simply by way of our thuggishness or inattention: “The constellation of beyng is the refusal of world as world.”
If earlier, Heidegger had responded to a question on humanism by recalling a
related request for a contribution to ethics by distinguishing between the modern
notion and the ancient Greek sense of the same, he also took care to be blunt about
the circumstances of such thought, as we have already referred to his earlier lecture
on poverty. For Heidegger as he goes on to note in his letter to a former enemy in
1946, philosophizing or thinking “about being shattered is separated by a chasm
from a thinking that is shattered.”87
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Maybe, and in the spirit of the small, the slight recommendation, we might begin,
after all this time, to take up Heidegger’s more complex question. That is his question concerning the “world, worlding,” as this would be “the nearest of everything
that nears,” now heard as we perhaps should always have heard it as the question of
Ereignis, that is in terms of what Heidegger called Eigentlichkeit: appropriation
appropriated as it were, qua the “ownership of appropriation.” (Ibid.) For as we also
know, from the start, what Heidegger meant by Eigentlichkeit was never ‘authenticity’ (and it is easy to remember that German has a term for authenticity, die
Authenticität) but owned ownedness, appropriated appropriation.88
Ereignis.
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